This content explains threat modeling for web applications and APIs: what it is, a practical 6-step playbook (scope, DFDs, threat models like STRIDE, mapping to OWASP, prioritization, mitigations), example API threat model, tools and techniques, ties to offensive operations/OPSEC, common pitfalls, and a quick sprint checklist. It emphasizes designing defenses proactively, prioritizing realistic attacker techniques, and pairing fixes with detection and continuous validation.
Threat Modeling for Web Applications — Make the Attack Map Before They Do "If you wait until the smoke alarm goes off to look for the fire, congratulations: you’re bad at threat modeling." — probably me, at 2 a.m. You’ve already met the OWASP Top 10 (we put the band on stage earlier), ...
What is threat modeling (for web apps & APIs)? Threat modeling is the structured practice of identifying assets, mapping how data flows, enumerating what can go wrong (threats), and deciding what to fix first. Think of it as building a detailed map of the building before you decide where to l...
The 6-step playbook (practical, actionable) Define scope & assets What part of the web app / API are you modeling? Entire app, a microservice, or a single endpoint? Assets = user data, tokens, admin interfaces, secrets, business logic. Draw a Data Flow Diagram (DFD) Boxes for proces...
Example: Quick threat model for a typical API login + upload flow Imagine a web app with endpoints: /api/login , /api/upload , /api/user/profile . DFD highlights: External user (browser) → /api/login → Auth service → Token issued User → /api/upload (multipart) → File storage (S3) → processi...
Tools & techniques (not just theory) Draw DFDs: OWASP Threat Dragon, draw.io, or whiteboard + phone camera (yes, seriously). Automated mapping and threat lists: Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool Attack-path analysis: use Burp Suite + API logs to simulate chained attacks. Continuous checks:...
How this ties to offensive ops & OPSEC (and why defenders should care) From System Hacking you know how attackers hide and persist. Threat modeling asks: Where would a stealthy attacker go first? How would they persist? Include these persistence avenues in the model: Logs and logging integr...
Common pitfalls (and how to avoid them) Treating threat modeling as a checkbox. It’s a living document. Modeling only the happy path. Attackers love edge cases. Forgetting monitoring: Without detection, mitigations are guesses. Over-relying on one framework. STRIDE is great; LINDDUN helps ...
Parting line (mic drop) Threat modeling is less about building a perfect fortress and more about building the right fortress in the right place . If your threat model shows attackers are most likely to pivot through your API file upload path, spend your time there — not polishing token storage on...
10 study modes available based on your content